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I. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the development of constitutional law under the political 
reform in Thailand in the 1990s, as a case study on legal and institutional reform 
following pro-democratic movements in East Asia. 
 
Since the late 1980s, we have seen many pro-democratic movements in East 
Asian countries such as the Philippines (1986), Thailand (1992) and Indonesia (1998).  
The successful pro-democratic movements usually led to constitutional law reform 
directed toward eliminating negative legacies from the era of authoritarian or 
dictatorial government, and establishing a new framework for democratic governance.  
For example, the present 1987 Philippines Constitution was enacted following the 
People’s Power Revolution that defeated the Marcos government.  The 1987 
Constitution not only returns to the model of the U.S. Constitution, but also adopts 
some new provisions and mechanisms for democratization.  The Constitution 
established some constitutional organs to monitor the government, such as the Human 
Rights Commission.  In Indonesia, the 35-year Suharto government fell in 1998, and 
it was followed by constitutional amendments and the enactment of laws for 
democratization.  However, Indonesia still seems to be seeking a new framework for 
stability of its parliamentary system. 
 
Thailand experienced the so-called “Bloody May” incident in 1992, in which 
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many people were killed and wounded when the Military fired into mass 
demonstration.  The people were protesting the Army Commander, one of the Coup 
leaders of 1991, taking the position of Prime Minister.  After this incident, “the 
development of democracy” or “political reform” was strongly propounded for 
advancing democratization, and it resulted in a series of amendments to the 1991 
Constitution (in 1992, 1995 and 1996).  Although the amendments of 1995 
introduced many reforms, a more comprehensive revision of the constitution was 
proposed.  Hence, under the 1996 Amendment, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, 
separate from the Parliament, was established to draft the new Constitution. After 
eight months of debate and pubic hearings nationwide, the CDC adopted a draft in 
August 1997, and then the draft was sent to the Parliament and approved in September.  
After approval by the King, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 1997 went 
into force on 11 October 1997.   
 
As seen later, the content of the 1997 Constitution, which is the direct result of 
political reforms in the 1990s, differs from the former Constitutions of Thailand, and 
is progressive in many respects.  Political reform or democratization in Thailand in 
the 1990s started from the movement to protest military rule, so one of the tasks of 
constitutional reform is to eliminate or exclude the mechanisms built into the former 
constitutions to legitimatize the rule of the military groups.  However, the scope of 
the 1997 Constitutions is not limited to this aspect.  Rather, most reforms introduced 
by the 1997 Constitution are intended to build a framework for enhancing democratic 
governance. 
 
In this regard, it should be recalled that historically parliamentary politics in 
Thailand not only were unable to prevent a resurgence of the Coup, but also provided 
an excuse for the Military to return to power.  Since 1989, there has been a 
resurgence of civilian rule as a Prime Minister took office through general election.  
However, the government was not free from allegations of corruption as well as 
political maneuvering among political parties, including heavy use of non-confidence 
motions against the government.  The decomposition of the government was the 
main excuse for the 1991 Coup.  Such political maneuvering was seen even in the 
constitutional reform after 1992.  In other words, the political reform was motivated 
by the unsatisfactory situation of the Thai parliamentary democracy. 
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The following sections examine “traditional” constitutional issues before 1992, 
and then consider some important components of reforms under the 1997 
Constitution. 
 
II. “Traditional” Issues in Constitutional Law in Thailand 
 
The most eminent feature of constitutionalism in Thailand is the number of 
Constitutions it encompasses.  From the first Constitution of 1932 to the present 
1997 Constitution, Thailand has had a total of 15 such documents.  The reason that 
Thailand has had so many Constitutions is that there were the frequent changing of 
political power through military coup.  When a coup succeeded, the new group 
brought down the Parliament and repealed the existing Constitution.  It was 
perceived as inevitable that each new coup group would enact its own new 
Constitution legitimizing their governance in place of the Constitution they repealed.  
Many of the coups resulted from power games among the ruling military groups, so 
there were few differences between the Constitutions.  However, each new group 
tried to plant provisions or mechanisms within the Constitution that would help them 
in the continuation and facilitation of their own rule after parliamentary politics were 
restarted.  As pointed out below, the demands of the people seeking democracy have 
primarily concentrated upon the elimination of such undemocratic aspects of the 
Constitution. 
 
The most outright approach used by military groups was the enactment of 
“interim constitutions”.  The Constitutions of Thailand can be classified into two 
categories: “interim constitutions” and “permanent constitutions”.  An interim 
constitution is one that is enacted shortly after a coup for setting up a tentative 
framework of governance, and replaces the repealed Constitution.  Usually, there are 
only a few provisions contained in an interim constitution, and significant provisions 
such as those concerning rights and freedom of the people are lacking.  As for the 
Parliament, the interim constitution provides for the setting up of a one-house 
parliament comprising members nominated by the Prime Minister (rather than by 
election).  Furthermore, some interim constitutions have contained provisions giving 
the Prime Minister strong authority.  
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The interim constitution is usually followed by enactment of a permanent 
constitution and general elections.  Permanent constitutions usually contain more 
provisions than the interim constitutions, including clauses regarding human rights 
and freedom of the people.  Permanent constitutions set up a bicameral parliament 
comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives.  Since ruling groups are 
usually reluctant to enact a permanent constitution, enactment of a permanent 
constitution is the first and principal demand raised by the democratic groups. 
 
Even if a permanent constitution was enacted, it usually contained some 
clauses or mechanisms considered useful for legitimizing and extending the military’s 
rule.  Until the first direct election of Senators in Thailand in 2001, Senators had 
been nominated by the Prime Minister or the ruling group.  In the past, some 
constitutions had contained provisions enabling government officials to take the office 
of Prime Minister, minister or member of parliament without resigning their current 
positions.  Thus, senators at that time included retired and incumbent government 
officials, including Military and Police.  Other than this, the Prime Minister was not 
required to be a member of the Parliament, and it enabled the leader of the ruling 
group to be Prime Minister without being elected.  In addition, the post of President 
of the Parliament was considered important for managing or controlling parliamentary 
procedures.  Therefore, the President of the Parliament was assigned to be President 
of the Senate, while the position of Vice President of the Parliament became President 
of the House of Representatives.  This type of arrangement was considered to favor 
the ruling group, since the Senate was usually under the control of the ruling group. 
 
The democratic movement had demanded the elimination or exclusion of these 
undemocratic aspects of the Constitution.  Indeed, the 1992 Amendments of the 1991 
Constitution are largely devoted to these issues. Under these amendments, the post of 
President of Parliament was changed to President of the House of Representatives.  
Some provisions prohibit taking the position of minister or member of Parliament or 
other permanent governmental official at the same time.  In addition, the Prime 
Minister must be elected from among the members of the House of Representatives. 
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Examples of “Traditional” Constitutional Issues (Before 1992) 
 
←Undemocratic                                            Democratic→ 
 
No   PM must be chosen from among the members of the House of Representatives     Yes 
 
No   PM/Minister may not simultaneously be a permanent government official         Yes 
 
No   President of the Parliament = President of the House of Representatives           Yes 
  (In the past, Senators were nominated by Prime Minister, not by election) 
 
Interim Constitution                                       Permanent Constitution 
 
III. Reforms under the 1997 Constitution 
 
Reforms concerning traditional constitutional issues began shortly after the 
Bloody May event, and dealt with a series of constitutional amendments. Many 
important issues, however, such as the matter of the Senate were dealt with 
thoroughly in the 1997 Constitution. 
 
There are more provisions in the 1997 Constitution than are contained in the 
former Constitutions. (336 Articles, including transitional provisions).  One reason 
for the increase in the number of provisions is that many independent organs were 
established, and the Constitution contains many provisions concerning the 
organization of such organs and procedures for nomination or appointment to 
positions provided by the Constitution. 
 
As shown in the number of provisions, reforms under the Constitution are 
rather comprehensive, but for an overview of the reforms under the Constitution, it 
may be useful to classify such reforms into 3 categories: (1) Reform for increasing 
political participation by the people, (2) Reforms for promoting and enhancing human 
rights protections and (3) Reforms for ensuring and promoting the transparency, 
fairness and effectiveness of the government.  The principal reforms of each 
category are as follows (not exclusive): 
 
1) Participation by the people 
 Reform of the Senate (Election) 
 Reform of the system for electing members of the House of Representatives 
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 (small constituency system and party list system) 
 Decentralization 
 Initiatives and Referendum 
 
2) Human rights protection 
 Increase of the provisions regarding the rights and freedoms of the people. 
 Establishment of the National Human Rights Commission 
 Establishment of the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts 
Judicial Reform (especially criminal justice) 
 
3) Transparency, fairness and effectiveness of the government 
 Establishment of the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court 
 Establishment of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
 Introduction of the system for “Examination of the Exercise of State Power” 
(Chapter 10) 
 Disclosure of the assets of PM, ministers, MPs and other public officials 
Establishment of the National Counter Corruption Commission 
 Impeachment (by resolution of the Senate) 
Special Criminal Procedures relating to certain public offices (Supreme 
Court) 
 Establishment of the Auditing Commission and the Election Commission 
 
As this list shows, reforms under the 1997 Constitution are rather 
comprehensive, but the following reforms are important to consider here.  First of all, 
the most significant reform of the parliamentary system was the introduction of the 
system for election to the Senate.  There were concerns that this reform would bring 
to the Senate the same political maneuvering seen among political parties in the 
House of Representatives.  So the Constitution excludes partisanship from the Senate 
by requiring that candidates for Senator not be a member of any political party, nor to 
have certain relationships with any political party as prescribed in the Constitution.  
Therefore, theoretically, Senators are expected to be free from inter-party political 
maneuvering under this Article.  The term of office of a Senator is 6 years, and any 
person who a Senator is restricted to one term only.  This provision is intended to 
prevent a Senator from seeking special interests for his/her constituency, and instead, 
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to concentrate on the more general interests of the Kingdom.  Based on the 
“neutrality” or theoretical non-partisan character of the Senate, the Senate is given a 
significant role in the constitutional system, especially in the nomination or 
appointment of public positions under the Constitution.  However, it is another 
matter whether the Senators actually do act as the Constitution specifies.  As results 
from the first Senatorial election in 2000demonstrate, some Senators have a variety of 
relationships with the political parties. 
 
Secondly, it should be pointed out that the 1997 Constitution has established a 
kind of plurality system for monitoring the Government, which will function 
supplementary to the traditional separation of powers.  Several constitutional organs 
have been newly established by the Constitution such as the National Human Rights 
Commission, Parliamentary Ombudsman, the National Counter Corruption 
Commission, Election Commission, and the Auditing Commission.  Other than these 
organs, the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court have established ways 
for strengthening judicial review. 
 
An interesting inventory scheme established by the Constitution is the series 
of measures provided in Chapter 10: “Examination of the Exercise of State Authority”, 
such as disclosure of the assets of certain public officials, and impeachment 
procedures.  Under the impeachment procedures, any person in a public office 
provided by the Constitution or other laws, may be removed from that office by 
resolution of the Senate on the grounds that the person conducted certain crimes or 
malpractice as specified by the Constitution or other laws. (The resolution requires a 
vote of three-fourths of the total number of Senators.)  The National Counter 
Corruption Commission is responsible for the investigation and examination of 
evidence and facts. 
 
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Ombudsman and Human Rights Commission 
have been set up to receive complaints from people who have suffered damages from 
the actions of administrative organizations or governmental officials, or from human 
rights infringements.  These organizations’ authority is primarily limited to 
investigation and recommendations, but the actual impact is expected to be substantial.  
These schemes give the people channels to participate in or to have their opinions 
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incorporated into governance. 
 
They see that the classical framework based on the concept of separation of 
powers does not necessarily guarantee the proper functioning of democratic 
governance, and thus, they consider it necessary to put in place additional 
mechanisms for monitoring or improving that governance.  On the other hand, it is 
true that the Constitution has many rather innovative aspects, and much preparation is 
needed for implementation.  Implementation of the newly introduced institutions and 
procedures is raising other problems.  It is certain that much time will be required 
before such a sophisticated system begins to work as designed.  The increasing costs 
of these organizations is another factor obstructing implementation.  However, it 
appears that the confidence of the Thai people is deepening with respect to 
parliamentary democracy (or, at least in the sense that we do not yet have any better 
system than the parliamentary system), and that they support the new framework 
under the Constitution. 
 
IV. The Necessity of the Study on Reforms after Democratization 
It is not unusual for Constitutions of countries with authoritarian political 
systems to contain some kind of mechanism to legitimize or cover up more or less 
undemocratic rule.  Further, it is not surprising that a study of constitutional law in 
Asian countries has focused on the undemocratic aspects of their Constitutions.  
After we have seen the many democratic movements in this region, there is no reason 
not to extend our study to the changing constitutional law of those countries seeking a 
new framework for democratic governance.  Legal and institutional reform in East 
Asian countries is neither perfect, nor working as well as it was designed to do.  
Such institutions themselves are but one product of the political process, and they also 
have to work under changing political situations.  Thus, it is necessary to examine 
not only the legal framework, but also the actual situation of its implementation or 
functioning.  Corruption would be the important factor in analyzing legal and 
institutional reforms after democratization, since corruption stimulates the feeling of 
inequality among the people, and it brings the people to an awareness of the problem 
of authoritarian polity, as well as of malfunctioning parliamentary polity. 
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 Comparison of the principal Constitutional Organizations: 
1991 Constitution and 1997 Constitution 
 
1991 Constitution 1997 Constitution 
Constitutional Monarchy Constitutional Monarchy 
Parliament 
Senate (no election; nominated by PM) 
House of Representatives (election) 
Parliament 
Senate (election) 
House of Representatives 
(election/party list) 
Parliamentary Ombudsman 
National Human Rights Commission 
Cabinet (Prime Minister and ministers) Cabinet (Prime Minister and ministers) 
MP has to resign when appointed as PM/ 
Minister 
Constitutional Judge Commission (ad hoc)
Court of Justice 
Constitutional Court 
Court of Justice  
Division of Criminal Cases for the 
Person in a Political Position 
Administrative Court 
 Counter Corruption Commission 
Election Commission 
Auditing Commission 
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